In this paper we consider the on-line max and min query auditing problem: given a private association between fields in a data set, a sequence of max and min queries that have already been posed about the data, their corresponding answers and a new query, deny the answer if a private information is inferred or give the true answer otherwise. We give a probabilistic definition of privacy and demonstrate that max and min queries, without "no duplicates"assumption, can be audited by means of a Bayesian network. Moreover, we show how our auditing approach is able to manage user prior-knowledge.
INTRODUCTION
The protection of privacy in statistical database (SDB) has been a problem of growing concern in recent years [5] . The goal is to provide statistical information about groups of individuals while protecting their privacy; only statistical information must be available and no sequence of queries should provide protected information about the individuals. If an user is able to infer protected information, then the SDB is compromised. A number of disclosure control methods to protect a SDB have been proposed in the literature (see [1] for a survey); one of these is auditing [3] , [4] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [14] . Two kinds of auditing have been studied:
1. On-line auditing. The queries are answered one by one in sequence and the auditor has to determine whether the SDB is compromised when answering a new query;
2. Off-line auditing. Given a set of queries {q1, ..., qt}, the auditor has to identify a maximum subset of queries that can be answered simultaneously without compromising the SDB.
In this paper we consider the first case, in particular the on-line max and min query auditing over real-valued data.
Consider for example, a company database containing salaries of employees. A user may want to determine the max or a min salary of the employees in a subset of records in the database. She cannot, however, be allowed to glean the salary of any one employee in particular.
In an on-line max and min auditing problem, given a set of max and min queries {q1, q2, ...qt−1}, the corresponding answers {m1, m2, ...mt−1} and the current query qt, the auditor denies the answer to qt if and only if a privacy breach occurs.
In [11] the authors deal with the max and min auditing, but the combinations of max and min queries in presence of duplicated sensitive values remains an open problem. The original contribution of this paper is threefold:
1. to extend the classical notion of privacy to a probabilistic notion;
2. to show as to deal with the on-line max and min auditing, without "no duplicates"assumption, by means of a Bayesian network;
3. to manage user prior-knowledge in addition to the past history of user queries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 places our work in the context of previous research; section 3 presents a probabilistic approach for on-line max auditing; section 4 introduces the Bayesian network as a graphical model to deal with uncertainty and shows how a Bayesian network is able to deal with the on-line max and min auditing problem; section 5 outlines how our model deals with prior-knowledge; section 6 discusses conclusions and future research.
BACKGROUND
In this section we provide the notation that we will use in the sequel and place our work in the context of previous research.
Notation
We assume that:
• T is a table with n records;
• K = {1, 2, ..., n};
• X and Y are two fields of T such that the elements of X represented by xi are distinct among them (each xi identifies uniquely a subject) and the elements of Y , represented by yi, are real numbers;
• the sensitive field Y has r distinct values (r ≤ n);
• the private information takes the form of an association, (xi, yi) ⊆ X × Y , that is the pair of values in the same tuple;
• S = {s1, ..., sr} is the set of distinct values of Y with si < si+1, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., r − 1};
• S0 = {s0, s1, ..., sr, sr+1}, with si ∈ S, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., r}, s0 a real number such that s0 < s1 and sr+1 a real number such that sr+1 > sr;
• a l-query q is a subset of K, that is q = {i1, ...il} ⊆ K. Let us assume that ij < ij+1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}; it is not restrictive, for example q1 = {1, 2} and q2 = {2, 1} represent the same query. In this paper, we use the terms query and l-query interchangeably;
• the answer corresponding to a max query q is m = max{yi j |ij ∈ q};
• the answer corresponding to a min query q is m = min{yi j |ij ∈ q};
• l = |q| > 1, because if q = {j}, clearly, yj is breached irrespective of the value of m and the association (xj, m) is disclosed.
Related work
Given a table T, the private associations (xj, yj), a set of max and min queries {q1, ..., qt}, and the set of the corresponding answers {m1, ..., mt}, in [9] and in [11] the authors define, for each element yj, the upper bound µj as follows:
Definition 1. ∀yj, µj = min{mk|j ∈ qk with qk a max query} is the minimum over the answers to the max queries containing j.
In other words, µj is the best possible upper bound for yj that can be obtained from the answers to the max queries.
Similarly, the lower bound λj is defined as follows:
Definition 2. ∀yj, λj = max{mk|j ∈ qk with qk a min query} is the maximum over the answers to the min queries containing j.
Moreover, if qk is a max query, then an extreme element for q k is define as follows: Definition 3. j is an extreme element for the query qk if j ∈ q k and µj = m k .
Instead, if q k is a min query, then an extreme element for q k is define as follows: Definition 4. j is an extreme element for the query q k if j ∈ qk and λj = mk.
In [9] , the authors demonstrate, for the on-line max auditing, the following theorem: Theorem 1. A value yj is uniquely determined if and only if there exists a query qk for which j is the only extreme element.
This means that the private association (xj, yj) is disclosed; this theorem is valid also for the on-line min auditing. Example 1. Let q1 = {2, 3, 4} a max query. If the user submits the max query q2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and m1 < m2, then the auditor can answer, because q1 has 3 extreme elements, that are 2, 3, 4 and q2 has 2 extreme elements, that are 1 and 5.
Example 2. Let q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} a max query. If the user submits the max query q2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and m1 < m2, then the auditor must deny the answer to q2, because q1 has 4 extreme elements, that are 1, 2, 3, 4 and q2 has only an extreme element, that is 5.
Example 3. Let q1 = {1, 2, 3} a min query. If the user submits the min query q2 = {1, 4} and m1 > m2, then the auditor must deny the answer to q2, because q1 has 3 extreme elements, that are 1, 2, 3 and q2 has only an extreme element, that is 4.
Focusing on max auditing, reference [8] proposes an enhanced approach that considers the implicit delivery of information that derives from denying the answer to a query.
In [11] the authors deal with on-line max and min auditing with "no duplicates"assumption. They provide the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Given a set of queries, {q1, ..., qt} and the corresponding answers {m1, ..., mt}, the database is secure if and only if every max query or min query has more than one extreme element and does not exist any max query, qi, and min query qj such that mi = mj.
Example 4. Let q1 = {2, 3} a max query. If the user submits the min query q2 = {1, 3} and m = m1 = m2, then the auditor must deny the answer to q2, because the user discloses the association (x3, m).
The question of auditing combination of max and min queries in presence of duplicated remains, for the authors, an open problem, because, in their approach, the duplicates make the problem harder. To see why duplicated make the problem harder, we consider the following example:
Example 5. Let q1 = {3, 5} a max query and m1 = 98, q2 = {4, 6} a max query and m2 = 98. Now, if the auditor gives the answer to min query q3 = {5, 6} with m3 = 96, then in addition to the previous information, the user also knows that max{y3, y4} must be 98 since one of y5 or y6 has to be 96. Thus, in addition to examining extreme elements for the query that have actually been posed, the auditor needs to examine extreme elements for such inferred queries as well, and there can be a blow up in the number of queries that need to be maintained. This does not happen in the absence of duplicates, since the first two queries could never have the same answer.
Problem statement
We consider the following definition of probabilistic compromise:
Definition 5. A privacy breach occurs if and only if a private association is disclosed with probability greater than a given tolerance probability tol. If a private association is disclosed with tol = 1, then the SDB is full compromised.
In order to show how the probabilistic definition is more secure than the classical one, we give the following example:
Example 6. Given y1 = 100 and qi, i ∈ {1, ..., 6} a max query, with q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and m1 = 100, q2 = {2, 3, 4} and m2 = 99, q3 = {5, 6, 7, 13} and m3 = 96, q4 = {1, 10} and m4 = 100, q5 = {1, 11} and m5 = 100, q6 = {7, 8} and m6 = 94. If the auditor answers the sequence of queries {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6}, then the user knows that y1 = 100 with probability equal to 0.8889. Even if in classical definition of privacy, a breach does not occur, because each query has at least two extreme elements, if we select tol = 0.87 then the auditor must deny the answer m6 because the private association (x1, 100) is disclosed with probability equal to 0.8889. In section 4.2, we will show as our model is able to compute this probability.
With our model, we will be able to answer the following questions:
• What is the probability that an element yj is equal to µj after a sequence of queries?
• What is the probability that an element yj is equal to λj after a sequence of queries?
• What are the probabilistic dependencies among the sensitive values after a sequence of queries?
• How we can deal with the blow up in the number of queries that need to be maintained in an on-line max and min auditing? For example, how to represent that max{y3, y4} must be 98 in the example 5, without maintaining the additional query?
• How we can model the user knowledge after a sequence of queries?
• How we can add user prior-knowledge? For example, what happens, in example 6, if the user knows that, with probability equal to 0.8, y1 ≥ 100?
A PROBABILISTIC APPROACH
In this section we deal with max queries; the min case is analogous. Let q = {i1, ..., i l } a l -query and m = max{yi 1 , ..., yi l } the corresponding answer, if the auditor gives the answer m then the user knows that:
The relation in (2) ensures that ∃j ∈ {1, ..., l} such that yi j = m.
Example 7. Let q = {1, 3} and m = max{y1, y3} = 8, then the user knows that it is verified one of the following cases: y1 = 8 and y3 = 8; y1 < 8 and y3 = 8; y1 = 8 and y3 < 8. Since it is likely that the user has not prior knowledge on the domain of the sensitive field Y , we assume that each of three cases is equally probable. Then
Given a l -query q and the corresponding answer m, the following propositions compute the probability that yj is equal to m, for each j ∈ q, the probabilistic dependencies among the sensitive values in q and consider user prior-knowledge.
and
Example 8. Let q = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, let mq=max{y1, ..., y5} =m, then if the user knows that mq = max{y4, y5} = m then P r(yj = m|mq = m, mq = m) = 1 2 , for j = 1, 2, 3.
Proposition 3. Given q = {i1, ..., il} such that mq = max{yi 1 , ..., yi l } = m, given q ⊂ q , with l = |q | > 0 such that mq = max{ys|s ∈ q } < m, then, ∀j ∈ q \ q :
Example 9. Let q = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, if the user knows that mq = max{y1, ..., y5} = m and mq = max{y2, y3, y4} < m, then P r(yi = m|mq = m, mq < m) = 2 3 , for i = 1, 5. Instead, if mq = max{y1, y2, y3, y4} < m then P r(y5 = m|mq = m, mq < m) = 1 Remark 1. In propositions 2 and 3 max{ys|s ∈ q } = m and respectively max{ys|s ∈ q } < m represent user priorknowledge. In particular if we consider q = q1 and q = q2 (resp. q = q1 and q = q2) the equations in proposition 2 (resp. in proposition 3) represent the probabilities after the sequence of queries {q1, q2}.
A BAYESIAN APPROACH
In this section we present the Bayesian network as a graphical model to deal with uncertainty and show how a Bayesian network is able to deal with the on-line max auditing problem and the on-line max and min auditing problem, also in presence of duplicated sensitive values.
Bayesian network
A Bayesian network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of variables and their probabilistic dependencies [13] . A BN, also called belief net, is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) which consists of nodes to represent variables and arcs to represent dependencies between variables. Arcs or links also represent causal influences among the variables. The strength of an influence between variables is represented by the conditional probabilities which are summarized in a conditional probability table (CPT). If there is an arc from node A to another node B, A is called a parent of B, and B is a child of A. The set of parent nodes of a node Xi is denoted parents(Xi). The size of the CPT of a node Xi depends on the number s of its states, the number n of parents(Xi), and the number sj of parent states, in the following way:
For every possible combination of parent states, there is an entry listed in the CPT. Notice that for a large number of parents the CPT will expand drastically. A directed acyclic graph is a BN relative to a set of variables if the joint distribution of the node values can be written as the product of the local distributions of each node and its parents:
If node Xi has no parents, its local probability distribution is said to be unconditional, otherwise it is conditional. If the value of a node is observed, then the node is said to be an evidence node.
Max auditing
In this section we build a BN able to deal with on-line max auditing problem. We represent the variable yi, for i ∈ K, and a max query, by means of a node in the BN. The model is an optimized version of the BN shown in [2] . Let K = {1, 2, ..., n} then |P (K)| = 2 n . Because the number of l -query from the set K is the binomial coefficient
and because we consider only l -query with l > 1 then the total number of queries on K is:
Therefore, because the number of nodes grows in exponential way when n increases (if we encode all max queries and variables yi, then it needs 2 n − 1 nodes), we incrementally build the BN at run-time. Given a l -query q = {i1, ...il}, if we build the node encoding q with l parents {yi 1 , ...yi l }, then, by equation (7), CPT size grows exponentially, thus we decompose the l -ary max operator into a set of binary max operators and we build the CPTs with a minimum number of states.
We have implemented our BN model using the Hugin engine and its Java API [7] . Given a new query qt, in order to represent the user knowledge, we consider the following phases:
1. if the node encoding the max query qt does not exist then we realize the temporal transformation, described in section 4.2.1, optimizing CPT size, as discussed in section 4.2.2;
2. we insert evidence on node encoding the max query;
3. we check whether a probabilistic compromise occurs or not.
In this section we assume that:
• Z = {z1, ..., zn} is a permutation of Y = {y1, ..., yn} such that zj ≥ zj+1, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n − 1};
• given S0 = {s0, s1, ..., sr, sr+1} defined in section 2.1, and a l -query q = {i1, ..., il}, with ij < ij+1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}, then ∃k ∈ {1, ..., r} such that m= max = {zi 1 , ..., zi l }=zi 1 = sk; • because each node encoding a l -query is a binary max operator, p1 and p2 are its parents.
Decomposition of a max query
The size of a conditional distribution that encodes the max operator can be reduced when the l -ary max operator is decomposed into a set of binary max operators. Two well known approaches to the decomposition are: parent divorcing [12] and temporal transformation [6] . Parent divorcing constructs a binary tree in which each node encodes the binary operator. Temporal transformation constructs a linear decomposition tree in which each node encodes the binary operator. In order to optimize our BN we use temporal transformation. For example, the BN resulting from temporal decomposition for the query q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is shown in figure 1 . Each max node in the transformation has size equal to r 3 , where r is the domain size, in our context, r is the number of distinct values of sensitive date. In the general case of a l -query, l-1 max nodes are needed. Inserting evidence on node encoding the l -query, we can compute the probability of the corresponding l nodes in the first level. If the auditor answers the query {4, 5}, then the sequence of temporal transformations is shown in figure 2 . Therefore, in the first level of BN there are the nodes encoding the variables zj, and in the level l, with l > 1, there are the nodes encoding the l -queries. We build the BN at run-time: given the current query qt, we execute a temporal transformation if and only if the privacy is not breached and the answer to qt gives new information. If no query is answered then the BN has not nodes.
Optimizing CPT size
In this section we optimize the model by building CPT with minimum number of states. Given {q1, ..., qt−1} a sequence of queries already posed, {m1, ..., mt−1} the corresponding answer and a new query qt with answer mt, for each j in qt, one of the two cases is verified:
1. ∃ i ∈ {1, ..., t − 1} | j ∈ qi and µj = mi (j is extreme element for qi), 2. ∃ a max query qi with i ∈ {1, ..., t − 1}, | j ∈ qi.
In the case 1, if µj, related to {q1, ..., qt−1}, is such that µj > mt, and in the case 2, we set µj = mt. Therefore, for each zj in the BN, we have to represent the following probabilities:
P r(zj < µj) (9) P r(zj = µj).
We build the nodes in the BN in the following way:
NODE ENCODING zj. The node encoding zj has two states zs1 and zs2 with zs1 < zs2 = µj. Therefore, unconditional distribution table has size equal to 2. Since we assume that the user has not knowledge about the domain of the sensitive field, the prior distribution is (
). In our implementation we can set zs1 = s0. Obviously, zs2 is updated after a query qt if µj, related to {q1, ..., qt−1}, is such that µj > mt.
NODE ENCODING A MAX QUERY. Given qt = {i1, ..., i l } the current query, mt=max {zi 1 , ..., zi l } = zi 1 = sk, max Node the node encoding the query, then maxNode has three states ms1, ms2, and ms3, with ms1 < ms2 = sk < ms3. Because zj ≥ zj+1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, also each node, in the corresponding temporal transformation, has the same states as maxN ode. Because equation (7), we have that:
• the conditional distribution table of a node encoding a 2-query has size equal to 3(2 · 2) = 12;
• the conditional distribution table of a node encoding a l -query, with l > 2, has size equal to 3(3 · 2) = 18.
In our implementation, we set ms1 = s0, ms3 = sr+1, and define the max expression as follows: if (and(p1 < sk, p2 < sk)) Distribution(1, 0, 0);
Inserting evidence on maxN ode in the following way:
the BN is able to compute the probability in (9) and (10), for each zj in the BN.
Example 10. Given the table 1, we set s0 = 0, if the auditor answers q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and q2 = {4, 5} then the BN is shown in figure 3 , and for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, according to proposition 3, P r(zj = s0) = P r(zj < 9) = 3 7
P r(zj = 9) = 4 7 
Figure 3: q1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and q2 = {4, 5}.
and, according to proposition 1, for j ∈ {4, 5}, P r(zj = s0) = P r(zj < 5) = 1 3
Remark 2. ∀zj in the BN, let A = P r(zj < µj) and B = P r(zj = µj), then we can compute the entropy of zj as:
Remark 3. With our model, we are able to compute the probability of the private association (x1, 100) in the example 6 of the section 2.3. See Figure 4. 
Max and Min auditing
Starting from BN model shown in section 4.2, in this section, we build a BN able to deal with the on-line max and min auditing also in presence of duplicated sensitive values; our model resolves the problem of the blow up of the queries that need to be maintained shown in section 2.2. In this section we assume that:
• given S0 = {s0, s1, ..., sr, sr+1} defined in section 2.1, and a max l -query q = {i1, ..., il}, with ij < ij+1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}, then ∃k ∈ {1, ..., r} such that m= max {zi 1 , ..., zi l }=zi 1 = sk; Figure 4 : Sequence of max queries 
• given a min l -query q = {i1, ..., il}, with ij < ij+1 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}, then ∃k ∈ {1, ..., r} such that m= min {zi 1 , ..., zi l }=zi l = sk;
• because each node encoding a l -query is a binary max or a min operator, p1 and p2 are its parents.
Given {q1, ..., qt−1} a sequence of max and min queries already posed, {m1, ..., mt−1} the corresponding answer and a new max or min query qt with answer mt, for each j in qt, one of the four cases is verified:
1. ∃ i ∈ {1, ..., t − 1} and qi a max query | j ∈ qi and µj = mi, ∃ a min query qk with k ∈ {1, ..., t − 1}, | j ∈ qk;
2. ∃ a max query qi with i ∈ {1, ..., t − 1}, | j ∈ qi, ∃ k ∈ {1, ..., t − 1} and qk a min query | j ∈ qk and λj = mk;
3. ∃ i ∈ {1, ..., t − 1} and qi a max query | j ∈ qi and µj = mi, ∃ k ∈ {1, ..., t − 1} and q k a min query | j ∈ q k and λj = mk;
NODE ENCODING zj. We suppose that qt is a max query; if it is a min query the reasoning is analogous. We build the node dynamically. In the case 1 and 4, we build the node encoding zj with only two states zs1 and zs2 in the same way as the on-line max auditing problem.
In the case 2 and 3, we build the node encoding zj with three states zs1, zs2 and zs3, with λj = zs1 < zs2 < zs3 = µj, where λj and µj are the lower bound and the upper bound after the sequence of query {q1, ..., qt}. Moreover, P (zs2) = P r(λj < zj < µj). Since we assume that the user has not knowledge about the domain of the sensitive field, the prior distribution of this node is ( ). In our implementation we can set zs2 = . NODE ENCODING A MAX QUERY. It is equal to a max node in on-line max auditing, but its CPT size is equal to 3 · (sizep 1 · sizep 2 ), where sizep 1 and sizep 2 are the number of states of the parents and they can be 2 or 3.
NODE ENCODING A MIN QUERY. We build the node in analogous way to a node encoding a max query; we define the min expression as follows: if (and(p1 > s k , p2 > s k )) Distribution(0, 0, 1); else if (or(p1 ≥ sk, p2 ≥ sk)) Distribution(0, 1, 0); else Distribution(1, 0, 0); In the following example, we consider the table 2, the queries in example 5 of section 2.2 and we see as our model deals with "duplicated values" in an efficient way.
Example 11. Set s0 = s1 − 1 = 93 and sr+1 = sr + 1 = 101, given the max queries q1 = {3, 5} and q2 = {4, 6}, and the min query q3 = {5, 6}, then the corresponding BN is shown in figure 5 .
For j ∈ {3, 4}, because zs1 = s0 = 93, it means that the user knows that P r(zj < 98) = 0.1429 and P r(zj = 98) = 0.8571. For j ∈ {5, 6}, the nodes have three states because the variables z5 and z6 are present in min and max queries. The user knows that P r(zj = 96) = 0.5714, P r(96 < zj < 98) = 0.1429 and P r(zj = 98) = 0.2857. Our model is able to infer that max{z3, z4} is equal to 98; in fact we can see that z3 ≤ 98, z4 ≤ 98 and if we insert evidence on first state of z3, that is z3 < 98 (resp. z4 < 98), then the probability of the second state of z4, that is z4 = 98 (resp. z3 = 98), is equal to 1. Moreover, if the user submits the max query q4 = {3, 4} then the corresponding max node has entropy equal to 0; thus the node is not added to BN. Moreover, if the tolerance tol is such that tol < 0.8571, then the auditor must deny the answer to q3.
Remark 4. By example 11, we can see that our model is able to manage efficiently inferred queries, in addition to posed queries, without maintaining additional nodes. Moreover, if the information is already present in the model, then the corresponding max or min node has entropy equal to zero and the probabilities of the nodes zj not change; therefore we do not add the query node.
Remark 5. Similarly to max auditing, we can compute the entropy for each node zj in the BN.
In order to better understand the combined on-line max and min auditing, we continue the example 11.
Example 12. If the auditor gives the answer to max query {1, 2} then the BN is update as in figure 6 ; P r(zi < 100) = 1 3 , P r(zi = 100) = 2 3 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. If the auditor gives the answer to min query {1, 2} then the BN is update as in figure 7 ; P r(zi = 99) = 1 2 , P r(99 < zi < 100) = 0 and P r(zi = 100) = 1 2 , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. If the user submits the max query {2, 3}, which answer is equal to 99, then the auditor must deny the answer, because it is disclosed that z1 = 100 and z2 = 99 (the node encoding z3 does not change because µ3 = 98 < 99, the node encoding z2 has only a state equal to 99 and the node encoding z1 is such that P r(z1 = 100) = 1); therefore the BN remains as figure 7 . If the user submits max query {1, 6, 7}, which answer is equal to 100, then we add the nodes encoding the variable z7, max queries {1, 6} and {1, 6, 7}, and insert evidence only in the node {1, 6, 7}(see figure 8) . The node z6 does not change, because µ6 = 98 < 100; node encoding z1 is such that P r(zi = 99) = 0.3333, P r(zi = 100) = 0.6666; node encoding z7 is such that P r(z7 < 100) = 0.3333, P r(z7 = 100) = 0.6666. We can see that, also in the node encoding z2 the probabilities change. If the user submits max query {1, 6}, the corresponding node already exists, then we insert only evidence on the node (see figure 9 ), but because the privacy is breached, we can not update the BN, it remains as in figure 8 and the auditor must deny the answer.
DEALING WITH PRIOR-KNOWLEDGE
An user can learn something about the state of the BN not only with a sequence of queries, but also by prior and background knowledge. In this section we show as our model is able to capture user prior-knowledge. We consider two kind of user prior-knowledge:
1. prior-knowledge represented by likelihood on one or more nodes in the model;
2. prior-knowledge that derives from integration with an other knowledge domain.
Likelihood
Adding likelihood is what we do when the user learns something about the state of the BN which can be entered into a node. The simplest form is the evidence, that is, the probability that a state is 1 while the probability of each other states is 0. In general adding likelihood we can choose a value in [0, 1] and take this value as probability of a state. Obviously, the sum of all probabilities is necessarily 1.
Example 13. We suppose that the BN is in the state of figure 10 , therefore the user knows that max{z1, z2} = 100. Moreover we suppose that z1 represents Alice's salary, z2 Bob's salary and that the user is a Bob's friend. If the user knows that it is very unlikely that Bob's salary is equal to 100, exactly that P r(z2 = 100) = 0.1 and P r(z2 < 100) = Figure 11 : BN after a sequence of queries with priorknowledge P r(z2 < 100) = 0.9. Figure 12 : BN after a sequence of queries with priorknowledge P r(z1 > z2) = 0.8. 0.9, then we insert this likelihood on node z2. Thus, the probabilities in BN change as in figure 11 ; in particular P r(z1 = 100) = 0.9091 and if tol = 0.9 then the privacy is breached.
Integration with other domains
The BNs are able to manage uncertainty between the different knowledge components, including the interactions among the various domains of uncertainty. We consider the following example: Example 14. If the BN is in the state of figure 10 and the user knows that it is very likely that Alice's Salary is greater than Bob's Salary, more exactly that P r(z1 > z2) = 0.8, then the probabilities in BN change as in figure 12. If tol < 0.9 then the privacy is breached.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have introduced a novel definition of privacy that extends the classical notion and we have demonstrate that max and min queries can be audited, without "no duplicates" assumption, by means of a BN. We have shown as background knowledge may compromise a SDB and how our model is able to manage user prior-knowledge in addition to past history of user queries. The goal of our future work is threefold:
• to consider the case in which the probability distribution of the sensitive field is public, and in particular is known to the user, therefore we will integrate this domain in our model;
• to use a BN as a unifying framework including the interactions among the various domains of uncertainty;
• to include combinations of different statistical queries.
